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Based on my recent work with several co-authors this paper explores the relationship between 
discretion, reputation, competition and entry in procurement markets. I focus especially on public 
procurement, which is highly regulated for accountability and trade reasons. In Europe regulation 
constrains the use of past performance information to select contractors while in the US its use is 
encouraged. I present some novel evidence on the benefits of allowing buyers to use reputational 
indicators  based  on  past  performance  and  discuss  the  complementary  roles  of  discretion  and 
restricted  competition  in  reinforcing  relational/reputational  forces,  both  in  theory  and  in  a  new 
empirical study on the effects restricted rather than open auctions. I conclude reporting preliminary 
results form a laboratory experiment showing that reputational mechanisms can be designed to 
stimulate rather than hindering new entry. 
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Firms, governments and international organizations repeatedly procure large amounts of goods and 
services of different value and complexity from outside suppliers. The fall in transport costs and 
other  trade  barriers  together  with  technological  developments  in  ICT  considerably  reduced  the 
transaction  costs  of  outsourcing,  shifting  the  balance  of  the  “make-or-buy”  decision  towards 
procurement.
2  
For a number of different reasons, from poor/costly contract enforcement to the complexity of many 
goods  and  services,  court-enforced  contracts  are  often  not  sufficient  to  achieve  an  effective 
governance of the exchange. Since procurement exchanges are rarely occasional, reputational forces 
may be exploited to improve on what formal contracting allows achieving.  
This  essay  briefly  reviews  some  recent  work  of  mine  with  several  co-authors  aimed  at  better 
understanding the role of long-term relationships (relational contracts) and reputational mechanisms 
in procurement. In particular, I focus on how these interact with other crucial forces, like supplier 
competition, entry, buyer’s discretion and the regulatory framework.  
Public procurement is particularly interesting because - besides sharing the governance problems of 
private procurement - it also has to solve the major problem of public governance: how to keep 
public buyers accountable in the absence of market pressures and with the many layers of agency 
shielding them from tax-payers’ control. The interaction between this regulation and the governance 
of quality in procurement transactions is all but trivial. Therefore, I emphasize more often issues 
related  to  the  current  public  procurement  debates,  although  most  of  the  results  discussed  are 
relevant for both private and public procurement.  
The debate on public procurement regulation is particularly intense in Europe at the moment, where 
the revision of the 2004 Directives 17 and 18, which coordinate public procurement in all EU 
countries, is taking place (See the EU GREEN PAPER 2011). However, there is a lively debate also 
in the US, in particular on how much discretion should be left to public buyers in the attempt to 
reduce transaction costs (see e.g. Yukins 2008) and on whether the use of reputational indicators 
based on past performance encouraged by the Federal Acquisition Regulations reduce the ability of 
new contractors to enter the market.
3  
A caveat is in order at this point. Space limitations do not allow me to discuss the many excellent 
previous papers on which the work discussed here builds. However, each of the mentioned papers 
has (or will have) a rich discussion of the related literature the reader can look at. 
The  reminder  of  the  paper  unfolds  as  follows.  Section  1  discusses  the  main  reasons  why 
reputational forces are important in procurement and how regulation affects them in the case of 
public procurement. Section 2 presents evidence on the gains that a reputation mechanism can 
produce in terms of higher quality looking at the introduction of such a mechanism in a large firm. 
Section  3  offers  a  tool  for  interpreting  these  effects  by  discussing  a  theoretical  model  of  the 
relationship between competition, discretion and reputation for quality in procurement. Section 4 
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2 We are talking about a large part of the world economy: public procurement alone amounts to over 15% of GDP in 
most advanced countries. 
3 The US Government Accountability Office just released a report dealing with this concern for the US Senate (GAO-
12-102R, October 18, 2011). The relationship between reputation and entry is a central theme of this essay. 3	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presents  empirical  evidence  on  these  forces using  a  Regression  Discontinuity  Design  approach. 
Section 5 deals with the question whether reputational mechanisms deter entry by new contractors 
looking at the results of a laboratory experiment, and Section 6 concludes with some avenues for 
future research.   
 
1.  Limited Enforcement, Reputation, Discretion and Accountability 
Reputational considerations are important in private procurement, whether they are informal and 
subjective or formalized in a feedback mechanism/vendor rating system (e.g. Bannerjee and Duflo, 
2000).  There  are  several  reasons  why  complementing  explicit  contracts  with  reputational 
mechanisms based on ex-post evaluations of contractor performance may improve the governance 
of procurement transactions. These are linked to the inability of explicit contracts to describe or of 
the courts system to verify important aspects of the procurement transactions at reasonable cost, but 
also to the high costs of enforcing explicit contracts through litigation. Several important quality 
aspects of supplied goods and services, particularly of more complex and valuable ones, are either 
difficult to appropriately specify in an explicit contingent contract in a practical and cost effective 
way, or they are impossible to observe or properly evaluate ex-post for a third party that could 
enforce the contract (like a court or an arbitrator). Even when a qualitative dimension or choice 
could  be  specified  contractually  and  verified  by  a  court,  the  cost  of  enforcing  the  contractual 
remedies and the negative effects that this may have on the continuation of the buyer-supplier 
relationship often prevent an effective purely contractual governance.
4  
Even in the formal world of public procurement, contracts are often not enforced. For example, 
some years ago there was an in depth investigation of how public buyers manage the framework 
procurement contract auctioned off by Consip, the central Italian Public Procurement Agency. A 
specialized  audit  firms  collected  information  on  the  execution  of  a  sample  of  these  contracts 
between 2005 and 2008 for a total of 4457 audits. It recorded whether the contractor violated 
contractual terms (technical and quality characteristics of the goods/services, timing of delivery and 
installation, accounting standards, after-sale support) and whether a penalty was enforced in case of 
violation of one of the terms of contract for which a penalty is required. Descriptive statistics in 
Table 1 indicate that the percentage of contracts in which an infringement (no-conformity to the 
contract) has been detected and registered by the buyer is relatively high, about 36%, 53% of which 
are  identified  as  major  non-conformities.  However,  the  enforcement  of  penalties,  the  main 
contractual remedy, is dramatically low: only 3.4% of the major non-conformities detected and 
registered by the buyer are contractually sanctioned. 
Corruption  could  of  course  be  one  of  the  reasons  why  contracts  are  not  enforced  in  public 
procurement, the civil servant in charge may be bribed to accommodate lower performance without 
exercising remedies. We do not believe this to be the main explanation for these data, however, 
because we would expect a corrupt civil servant in charge of contract management to hide the low 
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4 In his classic study of relational contracting Macaulay (1963) discusses extensively the latter problem and reports a 
purchasing manager saying: “One doesn’t run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because one must behave 
decently” (p. 61). On the often very high costs of contract enforcement see the discussion in Iossa and Spagnolo (2011) 
and references therein.   4	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performance rather than recording it in the books, as this makes the non-enforcement of the contract 
evident.  Moreover,  lack  of  enforcement  of  explicit  contractual  remedies  after  low  performance 
seems  to  be  common  in  other  countries  where  corruption  is  less  of  a  problem  than  in  Italy. 
Analogous  anecdotal  evidence  on  non-application  of  deduction  exists  for  large  procurement  of 
complex services in the UK (e.g. HM Treasury, 2006) and for elderly care procurement contracts in 
Sweden,  where  in  over  ¾  of  the  120  procurement  contracts  we  analysed,  credible  contractual 
remedies were not even present in the contract (e.g. Bergman et al., in progress).   
  
Table	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠNonconformity	 ﾠand	 ﾠenforcement	 ﾠof	 ﾠpenalties	 ﾠ(2005-ﾭ‐2008)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
No.	 ﾠ Penalties	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠpenalties	 ﾠ
Non-ﾭ‐conformities,	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ 1614	 ﾠ 63	 ﾠ 3,90%	 ﾠ
Major	 ﾠ 848	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ 3,42%	 ﾠ
Minor	 ﾠ 137	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ 2,92%	 ﾠ
Other	 ﾠnonconformities	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠ
identified)	 ﾠ
629	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ 4,77%	 ﾠ
Conformity	 ﾠ 2843	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠ 4457	 ﾠ 63	 ﾠ 1,41%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In  private  procurement  past  performance  indicators  affect  the  selection  of  suppliers  and  their 
behaviour because buyers can act upon past performance, refraining from selecting suppliers with a 
poor  track  record  and  favouring  those  with  a  good  one.  In  public  procurement  this  type  of 
‘discretion’ is typically limited. The need to prevent favouritism and corruption led lawmakers 
around the world to ensure that open and transparent auctions where bidders have equal treatment 
(even  when  in  some  dimensions  they  have  very  different  track  records)  are  used  as  often  as 
possible. Open competition is not only seen as an instrument to achieve efficiency and value for 
taxpayer  money,  but  also  to  keep  public  buyers  accountable  by  limiting  their  discretion  in  the 
allocation of public funds.
5 
In many countries this attempt to reduce discretion led to a two-stage contractor selection process 
where a qualification stage that excludes firms without the basic ability to supply is followed by an 
awarding stage in which only the bids are evaluated, with no reference to the characteristic of the 
bidder. This amounted (almost) to a ban on reputation, as exclusion from the bidding stage is 
justified only for extremely poor past performance. 
The fact that limiting discretion to ensure public buyers’ accountability comes at the possibly large 
cost  of  not  allowing  reputational  forces  to  complement  incomplete  procurement  contracts  was 
stressed for example by Kelman (1990). A recent study by Bandiera, Pratt and Valletti (2009), 
exploiting the introduction of a central procurement agency in Italy as a policy experiment, shows 
that accountability gains from a tighter regulation reducing autonomy may be small. They find that 
semi-autonomous public buyers (universities and health authorities), which are endowed with more 
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5Another  way  by  which  lawmakers  limit  civil  servants’  discretion  is  constraining  ‘discretionary’  payments,  i.e. 
monetary  transfers  not  based  on  observable  but  non-contractible  tasks.  Public  buyers  then  tend  to  recover  their 
discretion – for the good or for the bad - at the contract management/enforcement stage; see Iossa and Spagnolo (2011) 
for an analysis of discretional contract enforcement. 5	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discretion, are significantly more efficient and are not more corrupt than more rigidly regulated 
ones (central administrations).  
Kelman pushed for a deep reform of the US system when he was the head of public procurement 
during the Clinton administration. The reform pointed at reducing the rigidity of procurement rules 
in  the  Federal  Acquisition  Regulations  and  allowing  public  buyers  to  adopt  more  flexible 
purchasing practices common in the private sector, among which giving more weight to suppliers’ 
past  performance.
6  Since  the  Federal  Acquisitions  Streamlining  Act  in  1994,  US  Federal 
Departments and Agencies are expected to record past contractors’ performance evaluations and 
share them through common platforms for use in future contractor selection.  
In the EU things developed rather differently, almost in the opposite direction for member states 
countries with a tradition of decentralization flexible regulation. The EU Procurement Directives 
that coordinate public procurement regulation in the various European states considerably limit the 
possibility to use past performance information in the process of selecting offers. This has been one 
of  the  features  under  broader  attack  during  the  2011  consultation  for  the  revision  of  the  EU 
Directives.
7  Curiously  enough,  current  European  regulation  acknowledges  the  importance  of 
reputation for some types of procurement. For example, the European Research Council (ERC) 
funds  top  researchers  in  Europe,  selected  through  peer  review,  and  the  track  record  of  the 
researchers  is  then  the  main  awarding  criterion.  ERC  funding  is  distributed  almost  only  on 
reputation criteria in order to reach the best and the brightest. Other European instruments for the 
procurement of research, such as the FET-OPEN program, are based on a completely anonymous 
evaluation instead.
8 The reason why these two instruments are managed in such opposite ways is 
not clear. This is not surprising: the relationship between reputational forces, competition, entry and 
supplied quality/innovation is not yet fully understood, both in theory and in practice. 
 
2.  Reputation  and  Quality  in  Procurement:  Suggestive  Evidence  from  a  Recent 
Experiment 
While the US has been increasingly emphasizing the importance of collecting, sharing and using 
past  performance  evaluations  for  selecting  federal  contractors,  the  European  Union  has  been 
moving  in  the  opposite  direction.  Not  considering  differences  in  past  performance  may  clearly 
favour poor suppliers, possibly lowering final quality and value for money even if prices fall. But 
how large are these costs? What do we lose by not allowing reputation to work? 
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6As in the case of independent central banks, maintaining accountability after an increase in public buyers’ ex-ante 
discretion  (independence)  requires  more  stringent  ex-post  controls  in  terms  of  performance  measurement  and 
evaluation. A real of perceived lack of stronger ex-post performance controls may be at the root of recent concerns that 
this process may have led to excessive discretion and poor accountability in US public procurement (e.g. Yukins 2008). 
7See the summary of the replies to the consultation at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2011/public_procurement/synthesis_document_en.pdf . 
8Indeed, on the dedicated homepage of these programs one reads that: “The anonymity policy applied to short proposals 
has changed and is strictly applied. The part B of a short STREP proposal may not include the name of any organization 
involved  in  the  consortium  nor  any  other  information  that  could  identify  an  applicant.  Furthermore,  strictly  no 
bibliographic references are permitted.” 6	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To appreciate the extent to which reputational forces may improve procurement outcomes, I briefly 
describe the preliminary results from an experiment we carried out in Italy, documented in Pacini 
and Spagnolo (2011). The experiment - unfortunately not a randomized one (the firm we worked for 
did not allow it) - suggests that reputational incentives may be very strong, able to greatly influence 
suppliers’ behaviour already after a first generic announcement that past performance measures will 
be collected and used in the future for selection purposes.  
The experiment relates to the introduction of a vendor rating system by one of the largest public 
multi-utility companies listed on the Italian exchange. The firm operates in the sale and distribution 
of energy, water services and public lighting. In order to maintain an orderly functioning of its 
power grid, the firm outsources works worth over 300 millions euro each year. Since this firm is 
controlled by a public administration, it has to apply the Italian Code of Public Contracts when 
selecting contractors and awarding contracts.
9  
Being a multi-utilities company, this firm falls in the “special sectors” which enjoy some flexibility 
in applying the Code. Starting from the second semester of 2007, it introduced a system of vendor 
rating for suppliers with the aim of using ratings to reward good past performance with a bonus at 
the contract awarding stage. The plan to introduce such a mechanism was announced to contractors, 
gradually disclosing details on its functioning and timing, along 5 main announcement events: the 
20
th of December 2007, the 4
th of April 2008, the 10
th of July 2008, the 21
st of October 2008 and the 
16
th of January 2009.  
The vendor rating score was a weighted average of 134 criteria linked to the stringent quality and 
safety regulation of this industry. These parameters were collected by a team of (rotating) auditors 
in a number on site visits. Auditors attributed a score to each parameter inspected and the set of 
parameters is divided into two macro-classes, Safety (51) and Quality (83), further sub-ﾭ‐grouped 
according to 12 Safety and Quality dimensions (7 for Safety and 5 for Quality). 
These Safety and Quality dimensions could in principle be governed contractually, but in Italy 
contract enforcement is slow and costly. Moreover, managers in charge of contract management 
found it difficult to exercise explicit contractual sanctions without worsening the prospects of long-
term cooperation with suppliers.    
We had access to the results of inspections in the period between the 16
th October 2007 and the 19
th 
November 2009 across 45 different contractors, 222 contracts and 1,952 works sites of a sample of 
120 corresponding tenders. The inspections were carried out over the above-mentioned 134 criteria 
that were checked for a total of 64,537 times throughout the sample period. This has generated a 
time  series  of  64,537  observations  (i.e.  inspected  parameters).  Figure  1  shows  the  monthly 
distribution of the observations throughout the sample period (see the green bars), also with respect 
to the announcements. Moreover, we had access to data concerning 120 auctions used to award the 
contract, whilst for the remaining 102 contracts the corresponding auction data were missing. We 
carried out three simple statistical tests: i) a series of t-test on the 5 announcements relating the 
introduction of the vendor rating in the awarding phase on the reputation score and auction discount 
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9 The Code is the law that has implemented the European Union public procurement directives 17/2004 and 18/2004. 
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time series; ii) a probit estimation on the single parameters scores; and iii) the correlation between 
reputation score and auction discounts.  
FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The  results  show  a  strong  increase  in  provided  quality/safety  levels  starting  after  the  first 
announcement (see Figure 1, Overall Reputation). Significant jumps (structural breaks) take also 
place at the other announcements reviewing the collected individual performance indicators and 
giving further information on the development of the project.  
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
On the other hand, no structural breaks are observed in winning discounts/prices (see Figure 2): it 
appears  that  there  is  no  correlation  between  discounts/prices  and  quality/safety  of  works. 
Apparently, the strong increase in quality and safety has come as a (almost) free lunch to this firm. 
 
3.  Discretion,  Restricted  Competition,  Relationships  and  Quality:  Theoretical 
Background 
The relationship between discretion, the provision of non-contractible quality and the degree of 
competition and collusion is the focus of Calzolari and Spagnolo’s (2009) theoretical analysis. In 
that paper we address the possible trade off between a principal’s need to let agents compete to 
screen them for ability and appropriate surplus, and the need to leave agents sufficient future rents 
to  enforce  provision  of  non-contractible  quality/investments.  We  study  a  dynamic  model  with 
adverse selection and moral hazard where a principal trades recurrently with one among multiple, 
heterogeneous, privately informed agents when non-contractible dimensions of the exchange are 
more or less important.  
We characterize the optimal relational contract, defined in the broad sense to include equilibrium 
choices on explicitly contracted features, on non-contractible dimensions and on the competitive 
screening  policy.  We  consider  both  the  case  in  which  the  principal  can  operate  discretionary 
monetary  transfers  –  like  bonuses  conditional  on  non-contractible  performance  –  and  when  he 
cannot like in public procurement; and situations where agents compete in the auctions and when 
collusion among agents is an issue.  
We  find  that  when  agents  compete  and  performance  bonuses  conditional  on  non-verifiable 
performance are available, like in private procurement, the buyer optimally chooses: (i) recurrent 
open  competition  (open  auctions)  with  ex-post  performance  bonuses  when  non-contractible 
dimensions  are  not  too  important  or  there  are  few  and  heterogeneous  potential  suppliers;  (ii) 
negotiations with a single agent on an indefinitely renewed contract conditional on non-contractible 
performance when quality is crucial and there are many homogeneous potential suppliers; (iii) in all 
other cases restricted competition (restricted auctions) with past performance based incentives, i.e. 
recurrent competitive screening among a stable subset of qualified/loyal agents (the more important 
non-contractible performance, the smaller the subset), under the threat of exclusion. 8	 ﾠ
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In public procurement direct negotiations and discretionary transfers are typically not possible, but 
restricted auctions can often be used.
10 For this case we find that the buyer optimally chooses 
restricted auctions with the threat not to invite suppliers with poor past performance when non-
contractible quality is crucial and/or there are many homogeneous competing suppliers. When there 
are few heterogeneous suppliers - unless non-contractible quality is important - the public buyer 
optimally  chooses  instead  open  competition,  coupled  with  the  threat  to  switch  to  restricted 
competition  excluding  non-performing  suppliers  if  provided  quality  is  too  low.  That  is,  when 
potential suppliers are not too many or too homogeneous, public buyers’ discretion – their ability to 
switch to restricted competition and refrain to invite suppliers that performed poorly – is sufficient 
to elicit the desired quality without the need to restrict competition from the beginning.  
This implies that restricted auctions should be more often optimal now that globalization widened 
the supply market and increased competition, driving out more inefficient firms. Restricted auctions 
coupled with dynamic strategies that penalize poor past performance should also be more often 
optimal  when  the  buyer  cannot  pay  performance  bonuses  conditional  on  non-contractible 
performance, as is the case in public procurement (and in international organizations and some large 
firms with internal accountability problems). Private buyers may elicit more competition without 
losing non-verifiable quality because they can use informal performance bonuses to enforce it, 
provided  their  temptation  to  renege  on  promised  bonuses  is  kept  under  control  by  their  own 
reputational concerns.  
The paper then goes on studying optimal contract duration and the case in which agents could 
collude against the principal, identifying a general trade off between reputation and collusion.
11 
 
4.  Restricted vs. Open Auctions in Procurement: Preliminary Empirical Evidence 
Calzolari and Spagnolo’s (2009) results highlight the complementary but different roles of buyer’s 
discretion  and  of  restricted  competition  in  eliciting  non-contractible  quality  through  long-term 
relationships, whatever the reason why quality is not contractible.  
Discretion is necessary and alone sufficient to enforce moderate levels of non-contractible quality 
even  with  open  competition,  particularly  in  procurement  markets  with  few  and  heterogeneous 
potential suppliers. In private procurement discretion takes the form of the ability to pay a bonus 
conditional on non-verifiable performance measures; in public procurement such payments are not 
permitted and discretion takes instead the form of ability to use restricted auctions in the future and 
avoid inviting a supplier that performed poorly today.
12 
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Restricted competition must complement and reinforce discretion when non-contractible dimension 
are crucial and many homogeneous suppliers compete to serve the buyer, so that the informational 
rents with open competition are insufficient to elicit the optimal level of quality.  
Entry of new suppliers is then also limited in order to provide sufficient rents to incumbents to 
induce them to provide non-contractible quality. 
Of course discretion and restricted competition can generate corruption, i.e. they can be used to 
extract bribes from suppliers much in the same way in which they can be used to enforce non-
contractible quality. Ex-post data collection and controls become then crucial to keep public buyers 
accountable.  Whether  higher  corruption  or  higher  quality  is  the  dominant  effect  of  increased 
discretion in a given environment is an interesting empirical question.  
In Coviello, Guglielmo and Spagnolo (2011) we try to quantify the causal effects of the increased 
discretion and reduced competition linked to the use of restricted auctions in public procurement.  
We analyse a large database of Italian public construction procurements to estimate the causal effect 
of the use of restricted rather than open auctions on both ex-ante (number of bids, awarding price) 
and  ex-post  outcomes  (completion  time,  cost  overrun).  The  latter  outcomes  are  in  principle 
contractible, but regulatory limits to penalties for contract violations and high contract enforcement 
costs  severely  limit  the  scope  for  contractual  governance.  Moreover,  cost  overrun  still  create 
problems to buyers who may then prefer contractors that do not incur in them too frequently. We 
also try to identify the presence and effects of repeated procurement relationships sustained by the 
higher discretion left to public buyers when they are allowed to use restricted auctions.  
We collect data on a large sample of procurements for public works in Italy for the years 2000-
2005,  with  the  characteristic  that  the  award  mechanism  discretely  changes  across  them. 
Procurements are assigned by law to an award mechanism on the basis of the reserve price of the 
procurement  project,  which  should  be  rigidly  based  on  engineering  estimates  of  the  costs  of 
completion  performed  according  to  codified  criteria.  Procurements  with  reserve  price/estimated 
value below an exogenous threshold can be awarded with a restricted auction where a minimum of 
15 suppliers are invited, while those above threshold must be awarded with an open auction. A 
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) can then be used to compare auctions with reserve prices 
immediately above or below the discontinuity.  Absent sorting/bunching around the threshold, these 
two groups of procurements have different awarding mechanisms but should otherwise be identical 
in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics determining the outcomes of interest.  
We first look at the effects on ex-ante variables like number of bidders, entry and the winning 
rebate. We find that restricted auctions mildly reduce the number of bids but do not have any 
significant effect on the winning rebate. This is likely due to the legal constraint that requires at 
least 15 bidders to be invited in a restricted auction. It may be ensuring that although they allow for 
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interacts with relational contracts inducing parties to include in their contract clauses that at a first sight appear highly 
inefficient.  10	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discretion - in the sense of opening the possibility of excluding (not inviting) a given bidder - 
restricted auctions do not significantly reduce competition.
13  
We  then  look  at  the  effects  on  ex-post  outcome  variables  related  to  the  efficiency  in  contract 
execution. We focus mainly on work length and cost overrun. We find that the use of restricted 
auctions does not significantly affect cost overrun or completion time, but leads to larger limitedly 
liable  firms  winning  more  often.  Since  limitedly  liable  firms  are  the  largest,  it  appears  that 
contracting authorities choose larger firms when they can, thanks to the use of restricted auctions.  
We next study the effect of the awarding mechanism on the winning probability of incumbents, i.e. 
suppliers that already served that buyer in the recent past (defined in different ways). We find that 
relative  to  restricted  auctions,  the  use  of  open  auctions  reduces  the  probability  (frequency)  of 
awarding the contract to a previous winner by 83% (one interaction). It appears therefore that open 
auctions  considerably  limit  long-term  relationships  between  contracting  authority  and  firms, 
whether aimed at improving quality or at sustaining corruption.  
These are preliminary results that need to be checked for robustness to several possible problems. 
Still, they seem to suggest that, at least in the Italian public construction sector, the use of restricted 
auctions may have improved ex post outcomes (completion time) by unleashing buyers’ discretion 
without reducing competition but limiting the entry of suppliers coming from other areas. They also 
seem  to  square  well  with  Bandiera  et  al.’s  (2009)  finding  that  public  bodies  with  more 
autonomy/discretion were not more corrupt but were significantly more efficient in procuring public 
goods and services in Italy during about the same period. 
 
5.  Reputation and Entry 
Let  me  now  turn  to  the  folk  wisdom  among  European  lawyers  and  officials  that  the  use  of 
reputational indicators based on past performance would hinder entry of new suppliers and cross-
border procurement. This concern is apparently shared also across the ocean. As mentioned in the 
introduction, on October 18, 2011 the US GAO published the results of an inquiry on Federal 
agencies’ use of past performance information for contractors selection, in reply to US Senators 
asking whether this could reduce the ability for new or smaller firms to enter the procurement 
market (GAO-12-102R, 2011). 
It is natural to think that if past performance is important incumbent firms are likely to have an 
advantage that might deter entrants. The first formal analyses of reputation for quality in the 80s 
were indeed concerned with how reputational forces sustaining quality could be compatible with 
free entry (Klein and Leffler 1981, Shapiro 1983). However, in the case of public procurement and 
of firms’ vendor rating systems, we are talking about reputational mechanisms based on public 
rules,  known  and  accepted  by  suppliers,  like  in  eBay.  Formal  mechanisms  and  rules  give 
commitment power to the buyer and can be designed in quite different ways (Dellarocas et al. 
2006). A common mistake is to assume that they must be designed along the line of the eBay 
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feedback system, where new sellers start with zero reputation. This is a mistake in the sense that a 
reputational mechanism may well award a positive rating to new entrants - e.g. the maximum, or the 
average rating in the market – even if they never interacted with the buyer before.  
Private corporations often have vendor rating systems in which suppliers start off with the same 
maximal reputational capital - a given number of points - and then loose points when performing 
poorly and may recover them by performing well, but keeping below or at best maintaining the 
initial level. In these quality assurance systems incumbents that already served the buyer may have 
lost some of the initial reputational capital while any new entrant would start off with the full initial 
reputational capital. This type of vendor rating system creates an advantage for new suppliers, 
stimulating rather than hindering entry. This suggests that it is possible to design a reputational 
mechanism in public procurement that sustains at the same time quality and entry.  
To verify this conjecture in Butler, Carbone, Conzo and Spagnolo (2011) we develop a simple 3-
period model of competitive procurement with non-contractible quality provision/investment and 
possible entry (in the third and final period) and implement it in the lab. We use it to ask whether 
reputation-based procurement must necessarily deter entry and which are the effects of a vendor 
rating  system  on  quality  and  price  when  an  entrant  can  have  a  positive  entry  reputation.  A 
reputational scheme rewarding past provision of high quality with a bid subsidy in the next auctions 
is then introduced. The potential entrant in the third period has also a bid subsidy in some of the 
treatments. 
We find that in the absence of a reputation mechanism quality provided was low in all periods, 
prices  were  higher  than  production  costs  and  there  was  a  high  frequency  of  entry.  When  a 
reputation mechanism is introduced that rewards an incumbent that produce high quality with a bid 
subsidy in the next auction, provided quality was high, prices were not much higher than in the no 
reputation  treatment  and  entry  became  much  more  rare.  When  incumbents  that  produced  high 
quality  and  the  potential  entrant  have  the  same  reputation/bidding  subsidy,  delivered  quality 
remained high, prices did not increase significantly but entry was as frequent as in the no-reputation 
treatment.  
If confirmed by other experiments, these findings imply that there is no real trade-off between 
reputation and entry, i.e. there is no need to give up reputation and quality to increase entry and 
cross-border  procurement  in  the  EU.  It  is  sufficient  to  appropriately  design  the  reputational 
mechanism. 
 
6.  Conclusion  
The interaction between the shape of explicit procurement contracts and the design and functioning 
reputational mechanisms remains an important topic for future research. Relatedly, contract theory 
has developed under the assumption that contracts are either enforced or renegotiated. In reality 
explicit  contracts  are  used  in  a  much  more  flexible  way.  Theoretical  and  empirical  studies  of 
optimal  procurement  design  with  endogenous  contract  management  and  costly  contract 
enforcement, in the spirit of Iossa and Rey (2011) and Iossa and Spagnolo (2011), will be of sure 
value both from a positive and a normative point of view.  12	 ﾠ
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Of course, increased discretion and restricted competition can facilitate corruption besides eliciting 
quality. Whether higher corruption or higher quality is the dominant effect of increased public 
buyer, discretion in different environments is an interesting theoretical and empirical question. A 
main empirical problem is data availability, as most accountability checks and data collection focus 
on the bidding and contract awarding phases. Controls and data collection on the final outcomes - 
the really delivered quality and total payments – are instead necessary for reputational mechanisms 
to  work  but  also  to  ensure  real  accountability  (corruption  can  easily  be  relocated  from  the 
bidding/awarding phase to the contract management/execution stage). National and international 
oversight bodies should therefore focus much more intensively on coordinating the collection and 
publication of these ex-post outcome data that can then be used by researchers for doing more 
serious policy evaluations than those currently available. 
Procurement regulation has been and is currently changing in Europe, and the policy evaluation 
studies  commissioned  until  now  by  the  Commission  have  been  poor  from  all  points  of  view. 
Provided the Commission and member states improve data collection and make their data publicly 
available, an interesting and useful avenue for future research is certainly the application of modern 
policy evaluation techniques to assess the impact of changes in the procurement regulation.  
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The	 ﾠblack	 ﾠline	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠscore	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠinspected	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonth	 ﾠof	 ﾠreference.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠgrey	 ﾠline	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcumulated	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠscore	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠinspected	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠmonth	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The	 ﾠred	 ﾠline	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	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 ﾠblack	 ﾠline.	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The	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠbars	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 ﾠtotal	 ﾠnumber	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 ﾠparameters	 ﾠchecked	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−/+	 ﾠ	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ	 ﾠscore	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannouncement	 ﾠis	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠ(5%)	 ﾠlower/higher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ
0	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠscore	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
n.a.	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 ﾠnot	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Each	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 ﾠis	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 ﾠgroup	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Each	 ﾠblue	 ﾠdot	 ﾠidentifies	 ﾠone	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwinning	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠx-ﾭ‐axis)	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠwas	 ﾠawarded	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscore	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠ
inspected	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠlife	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠy-ﾭ‐axis).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠred	 ﾠline	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠregression	 ﾠline	 ﾠ
calculated	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ120	 ﾠauction	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠ/	 ﾠreputational	 ﾠscore	 ﾠcombinations,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreputational	 ﾠscore	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠvariable.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ
coefficient,	 ﾠ0.1855,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ(p	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ0.29).	 ﾠ
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 ﾠand	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 ﾠcorrelation